Abstract -The paper reports the results of a research information before concise information is presented to the program on target threat assessment. A ihreat assessment crew with a view to reducing information overload. Thus, process will be discussed. There are basically hoo computerised aids are critical in assisting the crew to become components in rhis process: intent assessment and capabiliry aware of real-time dynamic situations within the tactical assessment. Threat assessment was analysed using Cognitive environment. Furthermore, with the increasing complexity of Work Domain Analysis technique. A model of intent battle scenarios, more capable on-board and off-board assessment based upon Bayesian Nehoorks will be discussed sensors, and the multi-role capability of modem aircraft, the with-its test results. requirement for crew support functions which rapidly evaluate all available target data has become essential [3][4].
1 Introduction assessment is followed by a Cognitive Work Domain analysis on threat assessment. The analysis of the work One of the key factors for success on the battlefield of domain is needed in ,,der to define any environment the future will be the effective use of information. Kccurate constraints and processes by the threat and timely information is not all assessment task, regardless of whether the threat assessment information will be able to be used. In order to counter an task is or by a human operator, me enemy's action, its threat must be assessed correctly. The insight from the analysis belped an intent assessment of the threat Of adversarial targets is Part of an assessment problem using Bayesian networks. The paper overall assessment of the adversary's military capab es cOncludes with remarks.
[I]. Knowing the threat of a target is essential for an operator to prioritise target processing and to choose a suitable tactic to engage the target. The threat of a target is one of the main discriminators for classifying whether it is friend or foe. This task requires arl operator to collect large amounts of often incomplete and uncertain information from multiple sources and use it to assess the target's threat. The difficulty of the task is high as the information is often distributed among many operators. Considerable effort is required to gather all isolated pieces of information for the intent assessment task. According to the data fusion model proposed and Under the pressure of time, this task can become very maintained by the Joint Directors of Laboratories' (JDL) difficult and an operator may lose mental awareness of the Data Fusion Group, threat assessment involves capability current situation. assessment and intent assessment. In other words, the perception of the threat is in proportion to the level of danger it implies [6]. There is, in fact, no shortage of information. The rapid developments in avionics, COm"iCatiOnS, and computer teCbOl%Y have Produced Cockpit and back-end systems which can quickly saturate the aircrew with information. definition hat was preferred. This may lead to a high workload, with the overall situation becoming more complex, more difficult to comprehend, and Figure 1 shows a threat assessment process where with less time available for assessing its impact [21. These information from multiple souIces is used for both intent and circumstances can be mitigated by employing computerised capability assessment. A threat is determined as a aids which efficiently process and filter out irrelevant intent is one of the main discriminators for classifying whether a target is friend or foe since a particular type of aircraft may be in service in both forces. For example, An essential part of this process is a set of knowledge identificatiou of an aircraft as a MiG-21 or F-5 in the Middle libraries required for the task. Knowledge libraries exist in East does not automatically indicate whether the target is the form of the experience of operators or in the form of friend or foe [9] . Intent assessment is a critical step in a codified digital knowledge bases in machines.
process of determining a target's lethality.
Capability Assessment
It is important to point out the term "intent" is understood in many different ways by different people. From
The capability of a target depends on its platform the operator's point of view, there is more concem about capability whether, for example, it can manoeuvre fast 01 is a whether a target is a friend, foe, or neutral. In this research, stealth platform and on the weapons it canies for the the scope of target intent is broadened to include missions mission. Basically, the w e t must be identified first; then its that target is intended to achieve. It is defined as a particular capability can be inferred as shown in the bottom path Of mission that an adversary intends to complete with a Figure 1 . particular platform.
The platform capability refers to its ability to perform its basic firingflaunch functions and other inherent capability such as threat mobility, locationd adaptability, and weather capability. The firing and launch capabilities include slew rate, rate of firing, and intercept envelope [51.
Intent Assessment Task
Target intent cannot often be observed directly. What can be observed are signs that the enemy is engaged in particular actions or behaviour. Therefore, to infer the intent The weapon capability is also a complex subject that requires a thorough analysis. It depends on weapon characteristics such as types, warhead descriptor such as armour-piercing or shaped charge, damage mechanism such as blast or fragments, and threat lethality. The threat lethality refers to those factors related to the fire control, trajectory, and terminal effects of the threat in the precess of directing, projecting, and activating threat mechanisms designed to cause damage to a target [51.
Intent Assessment

Meanings of Target Intent
Intent refers to the assumed future behaviour of a target.
Knowing the intent of a target is essential for an operator to prioritise the processing of a target and to choose suitable tactics and appropriate weapons to engage the target. Target of a target, operators get as many clues as possible from different information sources such as radar, identification friend or foe (IFFI interrogation. intelligence, visual inspection, etc. Operators generally carry out a number of sequential activities within the overall task. Consider the activities of an operator from "initial detection" to "intent assessment" of a single target. The activities include recognition that the target exists, assessment of the environment in which the target is operating, and assessment of the target behaviour within the environment, leading to an assumption about its intentions. A conclusion about the intent of a target may lead to actions of fiuther investigation or to intercepting and neutralising the target.
Context evaluation involves the establishment of whether or not the target is coordinating with other targets.
For example, fighters usually escort strikers into an area. Often large numbers of fighters are sent in from one axis to distract friendly forces from a more threatening activity on a completely different axis. So if there appear to be related activities, the track would be assessed with that context in mind.
Cue analysis starts with a check of routine things such as IFF squawks', target's location and speed, a check if any flight plan which has been submitted matches the track, and a check whether the target is operating on a flight route or in a known region of a particular activity.
Sometimes, available information about a target is not sufficient for an operator to assess the state of a target, so direct voice communication may be established with the target. If this procedure does not produce any results, an intercept by a fighter for the purposes of identification may be considered. environment. It is, therefore, of paramount importance to explicitly identify all possible environment constraints. There are different ways to conduct a work analysis, however, the Ecological Approach suggests that work analysis should begin with, and be driven by, an explicit analysis of the constraints that the environment imposes on a resulting action [IO] .
A particular framework that was used is called Cognitive Work Analysis. Cognitive Work Analysis comprises five phases of identifying behaviour shaping constraints in a complex system, each phase related to a different aspect of the work done in the system. The phases are work domain analysis, control tasks, work strategies, social organisation and cooperation, and competencies.
Further detail can be found in [IO].
It is also possible that the evidence at hand is conflicting. For example, confusion about the identity of a target may happen because of garbling. This kind of
~~~i~ Description of Work ~~~~i~ A nalysis
confliction is rare however. More commonly, operators get a combination of clues that suggest several possible intentions and the difficulty lies in narrowing down the intent to the one work domain analysis w,A) includes modelling the physical and objective properties of a problem domain in which activities take place, Therefore, the anal,,sis of a work ... most Uely to be correct.
Understanding Threat Assessment with the Ecological Approach
Ecological Approach
Any computer-based system for human work is based on a certain set of assumptions about the work that it is intended to support. Rather than making those assumptions implicitly, the design of information systems should be based upon an explicit analysis of work [IO] . A thorough analysis of work helps us to understand work demands. The work demands come from two major sources, namely the physical environment and cognitive constraints. Physical environment constraints originate from the context in which operators are working. They d e h e what the operator cannot do. The physical environment constraints, also known as behaviourshaping constraints, specify what should not be done, rather than what should be done. In contrast, cognitive constraints are work demands govemed by human cognitive systems.
Another important aspect of military work systems is that they have to function in, and adapt to, a dynamic environment. When the environment changes, unanticipated events which can occur may pose a particularly difficult challenge to the system. Rather than automating systems to replace the human operator in such circumstances, a computer-based tool should be created to help operators adapt to unexpected and changing demands in the domain is independent of any actions. There are typically three dimensions in WDA which are: abstraction hierarchy, decomposition, and sub-domain.
In the abstraction hierarchy, a work domain is described using levels of abstraction ranging from the highest level of abstraction to the most concrete level of physical abstraction.
The connections between the abstract levels are stmctural means-end relations. In general, higher levels of the abstraction hierarchy represent the work domain in terms of its functional purposes, whereas lower levels of abstraction represent the work domain in terms of its physical properties.
Thus, the abstraction hierarchy is a structural map which describes how an outcome is achieved by employing some of the physical forms of abstraction as illustrated, for example, as shown in Figure 2 .
The decomposition describes a part-whole hierarchy with different levels of resolution, ranging from the coarsest level of the total system to the finest level of the system components. The decomposition hierarchy has been used like it would be used in the systems engineering discipline for the purpose of managing the complexity of the systems.
No work system exists in isolation. It has to interact with the environment to receive inputs that affect the behaviour of the work system. The environment within which a work system is located can be as complex as a work domain itself. On the sub-domain axis, a work domain can be broken down into different sub-domains that couple one with another [ 11][12].
1. Squawk is a term used to describe the radio transmission of an IFF code.
In essence, the domain iepresentation is a map that shows all the functional resources of the work in terms of categories for which the functional capabilities, required howledge, and limitations can be identified with reference to the various objectives they serve. In other words, the abstraction hierarchy can be used to identify the set of goalrelevant constraints governing the operation of the controlled system [IO].
targets are objects in their own right, but so too are political tension and environmental conditions. Figure 2 shows the work domain analysis of target intent. It is worth noting that this analysis is limited to the reference of target intent which is one of many general functions of the whole mission.
Therefore, the analysis is not complete for any other purpose.
Work domain analysis is also applied to the development of decision support systems in which a work domain representation is used to form the bowledge base upon which the reasoning mechanisms will act [I31 [14] . This is also the main application of WDA in our research.
With the ecological approach in mind, we first looked at a sub-domain of target intent from an environment perspective and then at a sub-domain of intent assessment from a defence system perspective.
Sub-Domain 1: Target Threat from the environment and an offensive system
On a battle field, targets are deployed according to their missions. Therefore, the functional purpose of the target intent abstraction hierarchy is mission completion. To achieve the intended mission a target's survivability and capability are normally important. One of the Objectives of an adversary is to maximise its chances of survival and to make its intent unpredictable to its potential battle victims. This property of hiding intent can also he one of the properties of an adversary's capability. The level below the overall function, shown in the centre of Figure2, is the purpose-related functions which include location, capability, tactics, manoeuvrability, as well as oppottunities or limitations provided by a changing environment. A target will use as many of these purpose-related functions as possible to obtain its overall function. At the physical level,
Sub-Domain 2: Threat Assessment from a defensive system
An air asset will be deployed to achieve a certain purpose. In broad terms, the aircraft is required to complete its intended mission whether it be reconnaissance, surveillance, strike, or something else. A strike aircraft needs to be adequately equipped to execute its intended mission, but also needs to be adequately equipped to survive the mission. The emphasis on strike ability and survivability will be different in a defensive aircraft. The difference between a defensive and offensive system are clearer at the level of overall functions in the abstraction hierarchy. One of primary overall functions of a defensive system is its ability to recognise and evaluate threats accurately and early. It uses intelligence, tactical information, and track information as well as allowable procedures from the rules of engagement to obtain its overall function. At the lowest level, physical objects include operators, communication channels, onboard sensors, rules of engagement, threat libraries, mission data bases, and hardware and software facilities within the mission system. Figure 3 shows the work domain analysis of intent assessment for a defensive system. It is worth noting that this analysis is limited to the reference of intent assessment which is only one of many overall functions of a whole mission. A detailed work domain analysis related to the AEW&C platform can be found in 
Rationale
h e of the challenges we faced was to select a computational technique which was capable of processing different types of uncertain, incomplete, and conflicting information. Uncertainty arises when we do not know the true state of the world, of the consequences of our actions, or of unforeseen interactions between the two. Information incompleteness occurs when we receive a suh-set of information describing properties of an object. Information conflict occurs when we have a framing problem either in the time or in the spatial dimension [161[171. Proper management of these properties of information is essential to the modellimg of the selected subset of intent assessment problem. A modelling concept based on problem characteristics allows synergistic matching of the Artificial Intelligence uncertainty management technique. The concept should define: (1) how to organise the knowledge for solving the intent estimation problem, (2) how to represent a state of belief in any hypotheses drawn from the cnrrent scenario, (3) how to update the state of belief given the evidence, and (4) how to make decisions given the current state of belief [9] [181. 
Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph which represents the prohabilistic dependencies between a set of random variables. Each node which represents a random variable in the Bayesian network defines alternative propositions. The propsitions must be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive for prohabilistic formalism, Collectively exhaustive means that all possibilities are represented. The directed Iconnections between nodes represent the conditional prohability (or likelihood) of inferring the existence of one node (being pointed to) given the existence of another node. Each node can have multiple inputs, that is many parents. Each node in the network stores its probability distribution given its direct parents and any associated evidence.
Bayesian networks provide a formal method for reasoning a b u t partial beliefs under conditions of uncertainty. In this method, propositions are given numerical parameters signifying the degree of belief accorded them from a given set of knowledge. The parameters are combined and manipulated according to the rules of probability theory. In the context of Bayesian statistics, the probability is interpreted as the degree of belief.
The essential principle of Bayesian networks lies in the classical inversion formnla: which states that the belief we accord a hypothesis H A defensive scenario is considered in this study.
allows the network to update the states of its beliefs once new evidence enters the network.
Stmructure
The hypothesis variable is a target's mission and its "Prt information variables are typically altitude profile, speed, as data' The expert knowledge is heading, location, IFF squawk status, air-to-surface (AS) or translated into some prior probability of some of the nodes of air-to-air (AA) radar status, and The the network and into conditional probabilities of the variables and their values are in Tab 
Assumptions
In this version, four assumptions were made.
. Only tangible evidence is considered. Typically, the evidence includes altitude profile, speed, heading, location, IFF squawk status, air-to-surface or air-to-air radar status, and possible platform types. Other intangible evidence such as environmental and economical factors are not considered. While environmental factors are not considered in this model, it does not mean that these intangible factors are not important. The target's mission has a direct causal impact on IFF squawking, location, heading, AS and AA radar StaNs, altitude profile, and possible platform types. In other words, the behaviour of a target may vary according to its mission. Furthermore, the altitude profile and platform type also have a direct causal impact on platform's speed and status of its AS and AA radar. Using the Hugin modelling software, a Bayesian network models this mission estimation problem as shown in Figure 4. 
Assignment of Degrees of Beliefs
A political climate of tension is assumed, in which targets may exhibit complex behaviour. Political tension means tile mission. assignment of prior probabilities to ,,odes and conditional probabilities to links is a critical step in the that an advenav is more likely to be deployed on a has-process of constructing a Bayesian network, nere are different ways to acqnire these probabilities [22]. In this study, probability is expressed as a measure of personal belief. That is, the probability of tbe occurrence of an event is a measure of a person's degree of belief in the occurrence of the event, given the information available to that person. According to this perspective, probabilities are properties of the state of howledge of an individual rather than properties of a sequence of events (e.g., tosses of a fair coin) [23). In fact, the conditional and prior probabilities are provided by a domain expert in this research. 
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The purpose of testing this Bayesian network is to examine the accuracy in deriving "intent". Accuracy is the degree to which this network can draw a conclusion that is consistent with one reasoned by an operator given the same information. The network was tested with 21 different cases. The test results obtained by this model are plotted against the estimate given by an operator viewing the same data as shown in Figure 5 . The machine predictions are reasonably consistent with those obtained from a human operator, althongh some inconsistencies were evident. There are a1 least two factors that contribute to these differences. First, there may be errors in the process of converting human beliefs into numerical values. Second, humans are usually very good at handling uncertainty and abstraction but are p r at generating numbers from their beliefs. Therefore, the human predictions used as benchmarks are also subjective as are the accuracies themselves.
Conclusion
A research program on target threat assessment was presented. Threat assessment is B .process that comprises of two components: capability and iutent assessment. Each component presents its own complexity and challenges to researchers.
The application of work domain analysis from the ecological point of view was proved useful. WDA helps capture different coupling parts of a work system which can be used as focal points to identify constraints which are either environmental or cognitivi:. In fact, the work domain analyses were helpful when information related to the task of intent assessment was identified.
The application of Bayesian networks in assessing target intent from uncertain and inconiplete evidence was proved useful. There is some objection on the processing of probabilities on the grounds that there is no evidence that human beings do not employ the probability theory in their reasoning process 124). It is a debatable issue. However, it is believed that an assistant, whether it is a person or a machine, should be judged on the quality of the performance rather than the technique employed. In this paiicular research, accuracy is one of the qualities to be employed for assessing the performance of the model. However, further work is needed in the area of leaning in order to compensate for some mismatches in the process of constructing the knowledge base for the model. It would also be desirable to model the whole problem in order to increase the usefulness of the model. Work on capability assessment and threat prioritisation is also needed to complete the research program. 
